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INSURANCE-MEDICAL CERTIFICATES OF
HEALTH AND STATUTORY ESTOPPEL
This article is an investigation of the various judicial decisions construing the purpose and effect of section 209.07 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which provides:
If the medical examiner of any life or disability insurance company shall issue a certificate of health, or declare the applicant a
fit subject for insurance, or so report to the company or its agent
under the rules and regulations of such company, it shall thereby
be estopped from setting up in defense of an action on a policy
issued thereon that the insured was not in the condition of health
required by the policy at the time of the issue or delivery thereof,
unless the same was procured by or through the fraud or deceit
of the insured. This section shall apply to fraternal benefit societies."

The typical factual situation which underlies the problems in the
application of section 209.07 is relatively simple. An insurance company
requires an applicant to submit to a medical examination, in the course
of which the applicant makes a false representation. Thereafter, the
insurance company denies all policy liability based upon the false statement of the insured.
2
Iowa decisions are relied upon extensively throughout this article.
1 Wis. STAT. §209.07 (1963).

See also Annot., 172 A.L.R. 143 (1948) for an
excellent review of this subject matter.
2 Iowa decisions are relied upon extensively since, as declared in Platke v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 27 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 133 N.XV. 2d
277, 280 (1965); "the underlying purpose of the legislature in enacting Sec.
209.07, Stats., can be learned from declarations of the Iowa Supreme Court
... because our statute, adopted in 1911, was derived from the Iowa Statute
[IowA CODE §1812 (1897)] enacted in 1897. In Weimer v. Economic Association (1889) 108 Iowa 451, 453, 79 N.W. 123 the court set out the purpose of
the statute:
."'The very evident purpose of the statute is to prevent the defeat of
recovery on any policy where the company has by its skilled agent, examined
and passed upon the fitness of the applicant for insurance. The estoppel is
directed to an inquiry as to the condition of health, and it is quite immaterial
what representations have been made or warranties given. The company,
having investigated, and for itself ascertained and declared the condition
of the assured to be such as required by its rules and regulations, will not
be permitted to interpose as a defense the physical infirmities of the deceased,
of which it knew, or might have known, as the result of its examination;
and the fraud or deceit referred to is that of procurring the report or certificate of the physician, and not the policy,. .."
While the original Iowa provision, §1812 of the 1897 Code, is identical to
its modern counterpart, §511.31 IOwA CODE ANNO. (1962), it is in some respect different from the original Wisconsin provision, Vis. Laws 1911, ch. 507,
§4202, and the present Wis. STAT. §209.07 (1963), which also differ from
each other in some respects.
Two other states have somewhat similar statutes to Wisconsin's section
209.07: SOUTH DAKOTA CODE §31.1507 (1939) and PURDON'S PENNSYLVANIA
STATS. ANNO. §511(a). However, the Pennsylvania statutory estoppel applies
to cases both where a medical examiner of the insurer passes on the insurance risk of the applicant and also where a medical examination is waived.
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HISTORY AND PURPOSE

The common law has long treated insurance contracts as a class unto
themselves, 3 recognizing that although contract law is applicable, superimposed thereon is a permeating body of legal principles applying solely
to insurance contracts.
The common law distinguished the two types of statements by the
insurance applicant which if untrue, even though not necessarily fraudulent, might be grounds for holding an insurance policy voidable at the
will of the insurer. One such statement, termed a "representation," was
collateral to the insurance contract and not an actual part of the contract. 4 Any statement made by an insurance applicant relative to an in-

surance purchase, such as his age or past health, was a representation.
Only a material misrepresentation by the insured could void the policy. 5
On the other hand, a "warranty" was considered a part of the contract,
and strict compliance in fact was necessary,6 regardless of good faith
or immateriality. The content of a warranty could be identical to a
representation, with the only difference that the former was incorporated expressly into the insurance contract. The original predisposition
of courts to treat the insured's statements in the policy as warranties
rather than representations gradually reversed itself, so that courts
eventually began to construe statements of the applicant as representations, rather than warranties, whenever possible. 7 Therefore, assuming
no fraud, the repeated issue before the common law courts centered on
the materiality of the misrepresentation. Materiality could be determined by asking the question, "did the fact or circumstance represented
or misrepresented operate to induce the insurer to accept the risk or to
accept it at a lesser premium ?"8 But even such a judicial liberalization
lost much of its effect when courts held that inquiry by the insurer relative to a specific matter conclusively established the materiality of such
matter.9
As a result, many states enacted statutes which had the purpose and
effect of placing warranties and representations upon the same legal
basis. The statutory abolition of the technical distinction between these
two concepts occurred in Wisconsin in 1909 with the enactment of Sec3 Crowell, False Statements by Applicants for Policies of Life Insutrance, 19
MIARQ. L. REv.228, 229 (1935).
445 C.J.S. 156, 157, Insurance, §473(4)a; Crowell, supra note 3 at 230.
545 C.J.S. 157, Insurance §473 (4) a; Crowell, supra note 3 at 230; Prieger v.
Exchange Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 89 (1859), Murphy v. American Mut. Accident
Ass'n., 90 Wis. 206, 62 N.W. 1057 (1895).
645 C.J.S. 156, Insurance §473 (4)a; Crowell, supra note 3 at 230.
745 C.J.S. 162, Insurance §473 (4)b; Crowell, supra note 3 at 231.
8 Supra note 3 at 232.
9See Cobb v. Covenant Mut. Benefit Ass'n., 153 M-ass. 176, 26 N.E. 230, 232
(1891).
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tion 4204(m),1O which is almost identical with today's Section 209.06
of the Wisconsin Statutes."
In 1911, Wisconsin enacted an estoppel provision 12 which was the
predecessor of Section 209.07. This section and section 209.06 are related in that each deals with the effect of misrepresentations upon the
insurer's liability. However, whereas section 209.06 lists three alternative attributes of misrepresentation, any one of which will cause the
policy to be void, section 209.07 makes an insurance policy voidable
only where the misrepresentation fraudulently induced action by the
medical examiner and disregards the alternatives of "contributed to the
loss" and "increased the risk."
The Wisconsin court clearly expressed the scope and relationship of
these two statutes in Frozenav.Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.:
There seems to be no escape from the conclusion that where a
medical exam is had and a report made that the applicant is a fit
subject for insurance, an estoppel arises against the company in
the absence of fraud or deceit practiced by the insured upon the
medical examiner in order to induce a favorable report and that
the provisions of sec. 209.06 avoiding the policy where an innocent misrepresentation increases the risk, must be limited to situations where there has been no certificate of health or recommendation of the risk by the examiner."3
As expressed by the court, section 209.06 bows to an application of
section 209.07 where a certificate of health or its statutory equivalent is
issued without fraud. This holding has been given recent confirmation
by Platke v. John Hancock Ins. Co.:4
The basic purpose of the estoppel statute appears to be the protection
of the insured. While section 209.06 placed the risk of innocent misrepresentations-material to the issuance of the policy-upon the insured,
section 209.07, enacted several years later, in effect shifted that risk to
the insurer. Indeed, the basic purpose of section 209.07 apears to be the
protection of the insured. The protection being statutory in nature and
a matter of public policy, it may not be waived by the insured. Insofar
10 Wis. Laws 1909, ch. 288.

"Wis. STAT. §209.06 (1963) provides: "(1) No oral or written statement, representation or warranty made by the insured or in his behalf in the negotiation
of a contract of insurance shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the
policy, unless such statement, representation or warranty was false and
made with intent to deceive, or unless the matter misrepresented or made
a warranty increased the risk or contributed to the loss.
(2) No breach of a warranty in a policy shall defeat or avoid such policy
unless the breach of such warranty increase the risk at the time of the loss,
or contributed to the loss, or existed at the time of the loss.
(3) This section applies to fraternal benefit societies.
12 Wis. Laws 1911, ch. 507, §4202.
13211 Wis. 373, 376, 247 N.W. 333, 334 (1933).
1427 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 133 N.W. 2d 277, 280 (1965).
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as the statute and life insurance policy are inconsistent or incompatible,
the statute governs. 13
209.07
disability insurlife
and
for
The statute applies only to applications
ance policies. The medical examiner referred to by the statute is not the
medical director of the insurance company, but the actual examining
physician who performs the physical examination for the insurance
REQUIREMENTS

FOR OPERATION OF SECTION

company.16

For the statute to be operative, the examiner must either (1) issue a
certificate of health; (2) declare that the applicant is a fit subject for
insurance; or, (3) so report to the company or its agent. Furthermore,
such certificate, declaration or report must not have been procured by
or through the fraud or deceit of the insured.
While section 209.07 designates three distinct acts by the medical
examiner, any one of which will cause the statute to be applicable, it
appears the courts have failed to make any real distinction between the
three and seem, in effect, to treat them as synonymous. Substance and
not the form of the report is determinative of whether it is within the
contemplation of the statute.
THE NATURE OF THE ESTOPPEL

The effect of section 209.07 was precisely defined in Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Cunningham:
The statute declares an 'estoppel' in a certain fact situation. This
estoppel is positive and is not rebuttable. When the fact situation
exists (as here), the statute exerts its full force and the provisions in the contract relating to innocent false statements in the
application for insurance lose all influence whatever may be the
fact as to the truth or falsity of such statements. Thus the effect
of the statute is, in a practical sense, to change the contract while
the method of bringing about that effect is through estoppel which
is often regarded as remedial. This is that character of estoppel
which is really 'a rule of substantive law masquerading as a rule
of evidence ....

17

While estoppel is basically a procedural device which the law supplies as a remedy to prevent legal recognition of an otherwise relevant
15 Schware v. Home Life Ins. Co., 134 Pa. Super. 53, 3 A. 2d 949, 952 (1939).
16 The Iowa Court declared such in the case of Peterson v. Des Moines Life
Ass'n., 115 Iowa 668, 87 N.W. 397, 398 (1901):
"It is no doubt customary for life insurance companies to have a general
medical advisor or director at the home office, whose advice is taken into
account in determining whether the risk shall be accepted; but the person
who makes the actual examination, and reports on applicant's condition,
is evidently the medical examiner or physician referred to."
1787 F. 2d 842, 845 (1937). In this case the health of the insured was precarious
at the time of the required medical examination and at the time of the delivery of the policy. However, the insured was ignorant of that fact.
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allegation of one party to an action, by statute it has the effect of a substantive rule incorporated as a term of the insurance contract."8
The estoppel created by the statute is effective only as to those matters affecting the condition of health of the applicant prior to the issuing of the policy.19 In the absence of fraud and assuming the issuance
of a medical certificate or its statutory equivalent, the insurer is
estopped, or legally prevented from denying the truthfulness of statements made by the insured to the medical examined which had a bearing on the physical condition or health of the insurer. Such matters include not ,only statements of the insured concerning his own health,
past and present, but also statements made regarding the health of
ancestors and other members of the applicant's family. 20 "There may,

no doubt, be warranties as to other matters not relating to the health of
the insured,-such as his place of residence or occupation,--breach of
which will avoid the policy notwithstanding the statute. . . . "' These
statements being outside the scope of section 209.07, should be examined
in the light of section 209.06's three tests for voidability.2
The next question which presents itself is whether the statute's
estoppel applies only to the condition of health of the applicant as of
the time of the examination, or does it extend beyond this and include
the time up to the issuance of the policy? It is certain that section
209.07's estoppel, preventing the insurer from denying "that the insured was not in the condition of health required by the policy" applies at least to the condition of health as of the time of the examination.
The common law rule was defined by the court when it stated, "the
generally accepted rule is that the applicant ... is under a duty to disclose to the insurance company any facts which develop or are discovered by him after the making of the application, before the policy
takes effect, that materially increase the risk." 23 However, the Wisconsimilar decision to Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, supra note 17, was
made in Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Mann, 233 Iowa 293, 7 N.W. 2d 566
(1943), and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hesseling, 236 Iowa 412, 19 N.W. 2d
191 (1945).
19
"The estoppel is directed to inquiry as to the condition of health, and it
is quite immaterial what representations have been made or warranties
given. The company having investigated, and for itself ascertained and
declared the condition of the assured to be such as required by its rules
and regulations, will not be permitted to interpose as a defense the physical infirmities of the deceased, of which it knew, or might have known,
as the result of its examination . . ." Weimer v. Economic Life Ass'n.,
108 Iowa 451, 79 N.W. 123 (1899).
20 McGowann v. Supreme Court of Independent Order of Foresters, 104 Wis.
173, 183, 80 N.W. 603, 607 (1899).
21 Peterson v. Des Moines Life Ass'n., 115 Iowa 668, 87 N.V. 397, 398 (1901).
22 That is, whether a) "such statement, representation, or warranty was false
and made with intent to deceive," or b) "the matter represented or made a
warranty increased the risk," or c) "contributed to the loss."
23 Fjeseth v. New York Life Ins. Co., 20 Wis. 2d 295, 302, 122 N.W. 2d 49,
53 (1963).
28A
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sin statute, section 209.07, and its Iowa counterpart,24 provided that the
estoppel applies to the condition of health required by the policy at the
time of issue or delivery. Thus, with the creation of section 209.07, the
widely held common law rule was swept away. 25 Today, in cases where
the estoppel arises, it applies to all matters affecting health subsequent
to the examination, up to the time of the issuance of the insurance
2
policy. 6

The Iowa court stated this principle in Peterson v. Des Moines Life
Ass'n.:
It is to be noticed that the estoppel declared by the statute is as
to the condition of health of the assured at the time the policy
was issued. ...

In short we think that the estoppel relates to all

matters inquired about so far as they bear on the health and physical condition of the applicant affecting the risk, whether they
refer to the time the policy is issued or some previous time; for
the ultimate question is whether the applicant
is a suitable person
27
to accept as a subject of life insurance.
The Iowa court extended this thought in Mickel v. Mut. Life Ins. Co.:
[A] n insurance company has a right to contract with an applicant
that the policy shall not go into effect until delivery thereof to
such applicant while he is in good health, but such provision is for
the sole benefit of the insurer and gives it the option to refuse to
deliver the policy to the applicant, if he is not at the time in good
health. In other words, the insurer has the option of withholding
the policy, in which event it would not go into effect, or of delivering it to the insured. If it accepts the latter alternative, the
policy goes into effect at once, and the bar of the statute precludes
the insurer
from setting up the contract as a defense in an action
28
thereon.

The statute has the effect of destroying any defense to policy liability which has its basis in a false statement of facts material to insurance risks, where such action is not inspired by deceit or fraud. Then
too, any condition affecting the insurability of the insurance applicant,
such as a stroke, occuring at any time either prior or subsequent to the
physical examination by the insurer, is not grounds for a defense by the
insurer, per se, if concealed. That is, even though the applicant fails to
disclose a fact material to the insurability of the applicant, such failure
under section 209.07, will not be a basis upon which the insurance
company can refuse to admit policy liability, if such concealment was
innocent and without an actual intent to defraud the insurance company.
24 IOWA CODE ANNOTATED §511.31 (1962).
25 VANCE, INSURANCE §74 (3rd. ed. 1951).
2
6 Ludwig v. John Hancock Mut. Life

Ins. Co., 271 Wis. 549, 554, 74 N.W. 2d
201, 204 (1956). Although, this case is cited, the author feels the reasoning
of this case is not satisfactory.
27 115 Iowa at 668, 87 N.W. at 398-399.
28 204 Iowa 1266, 213 N.W. 765, 768 (1927).
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THE NATURE OF THE MEDICAL REPORT

The courts have been almost universal in their declarations that more
than a mere certification of the physical measurements made by the
examiner is required as a basis for an application of the statutory estoppel. Typical of such decisions is the Wisconsin Court's holding in Jesperson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.:
The medical examiner simply certified height, weight, measurements, pulse, and blood pressure and that he found no evidence
of impairment of the heart, brain, stomach, lungs, etc. These answers were all in response to specific questions required to be answered by the medical examiner and there is nowhere in the
record, so far as we can discover, a certification of health or declaration that the applicant is a fit subject for insurance. Under
these circumstances sec. 209.06 applies to make an innocent representation by the insured which increases the risk a circumstance
avoiding the policy. Hence, while we consider that the jury's findneed
ing as to intent to deceive is supported by the evidence, we
29
not labor this point because the point becomes immaterial.
The first Iowa case that dealt with its statutory estoppel provision,
was Weimer v.Economic Life Ass'n.3° Two of the questions in the
physical examination report form furnished by the insurer to the medical examiner were: "Are you satisfied that there is nothing in the
applicant's physical condition, habits, personal or family history, not
distinctly set forth, tending to shorten her life?.. . Do you unquestionably recommend the applicant for insurance? 31 Both of these questions
were answered in the affirmative by the examiner and a life insurance
policy was issued. The court, in holding the estoppel statute applicable,
declared:
Where, in answer to one or more questions, or in some other way,
the examiner, in words or in language so meaning, declares that
the applicant is a fit subject for insurance, it is sufficient. The
very evident purpose of the statute is to prevent the defeat of recovery on any policy where the company has, by its skilled agent,
examined and passed upon the fitness of the applicant for insurance.3
38
In all the cases in which the Iowa court applied its estoppel statute,
the questions found in the insurance policy application forms were directed to the medical examiner, and specifically referred to the insurance risk or the insurability of the applicant. Such questions, when an29251
30108

Wis. 1, 4-5, 27 N.W. 2d 775, 777 (1947).
Iowa 451, 79 N.W. 123 (1899).

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.
33 Bolting v. New York Life Ins. Co., 182 Iowa 797, 166 N.W. 278 (1918) ; Faber
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 211 Iowa 740, 265 N.VW. 305 (1936); McNabb v.
State Farm Life Ins. Co., 116 F. Supp. 641 (S.D. Iowa 1953); Crandall v.
Banker's Life Company, 245 Iowa 540, 62 N.W. 2d 169 (1954).
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swered favorably to the applicant by the insurer's medical examiner,
clearly put the issuance of the policy within the application of the estoppel statute. In cases such as these, few would argue that the Iowa court
had extended the scope of the statute beyond its intended purpose and
intent. The statute is not applicable unless there has actually been a
determination of insurability by the medical examiner.
Wisconsin followed the reasoning of the early Iowa decisions. In
the Frozena case,34 the medical examiner had characterized the applicant as a "first-class" risk medically in answer to a question in the report form asking him to characterize the applicant as a "first-class,
average, doubtful or poor" insurance risk. Acting upon such facts, the
court issued its landmark distinction between mere certification of physical tests and measurements without comment and the actual reporting
to the insurance company that the applicant was a fit subject for insurance. The court held that only the latter gave rise to an application of
section 209.07.35
In Gibson v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., the court held that the medical examiner, negatively answering the question "in your opinion is this
risk questionable because of any factor such as presence or history of
mental or physical defect, character, habits, or environment""6 in effect
made a "declaration that the applicant was a fit subject for insurance."
The court declared:
We are unable to perceive substantial distinction in the purpose
and effect of the question here compared to one which may have
inquired; "In your opinion is the applicant a fit subject for insurance because of the presence or history of a physical defect,
et c. ? ,,37
In the 1963 case of Feseth v. New York Life Ins. Co.,3 8 the court

summarily dismissed any discussion of section 209.07 by declaring that
there was no evidence that the insurer's medical examiner ever certified the insured's health to the insurer. The court, holding section 209.07
inapplicable, also pointed out that the policy expressly stated that the
medical examiner is not authorized to pass upon insurability. A question
arises as to whether the court could have based its decision upon this
last point alone. May a court rely solely upon such a provision in an
insurance medical application form and fail to give effect to section
209.07 when the examiner acting on his own does in effect certify the
health or pass upon the insurability of an applicant? In such cases a
showing of actual reliance by the insurer on such unauthorized evalua3 Frozena v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 211 Wis. 373, 374, 247 N.W. 333, 333
(1933).
35 Id. at 376, 247 N.W. at 334.
36 274 Wis. 277, 281, 80 N%.V. 2d 233, 235 (1956).
7 Id. at 287, 80 N.W. 2d at 238.
3820 Wis. 2d 295, 297, 122 N.W. 2d 49, 50 (1963).
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tions would seem to be sufficient to effectuate an application by the
courts of section 209.07. It would also appear proper to disregard express application provisions denying the medical examiner's authority
to judge insurability, if the application in fact contained questions which
in effect solicited such judgment.
The most recent Wisconsin case dealing with section 209.07 has
been the most radical as far as its determination of the type of medical
examiner's report which comes within the purview of the estoppel section. In Platka 9 the Wisconsin court based its application of section
209.07 upon the negative response to the last question in the medical
examination report. The medical examiner was asked this question: "In
your opinion is there anything detrimental in the habits, surroundings
or occupation of the proposed insured ?"40 This is the only case where
either a Wisconsin or an Iowa court has applied the estoppel statute to
a medical report in which the medical examiner was not requested to
pass specifically on the "risk" or "insurability" of the applicant. The
majority in the Platke case held that the examiner's answer to the above
question in the application form constituted a certificate of health or a
declaration that the applicant was a fit subject for insurance under the
estoppel statute. After an investigation of the prior cases dealing with
the estoppel statute, the court declared, "[Ilt becomes clear that no special verbiage is required to constitute the certification or declaration
' 41
contemplated in Sec. 209.07. Stats."
The dissent in that case held, "The court's opinion comes perilously
close to holding that all of these medical examiner reports in which the
physician certifies to the findings made by him of his physical examination of the applicant constitutes a certificate of health or declaration of
fitness." 2 The dissent then formulated a test which they declared should
be applied to determine whether a medical examiner's report comes
within the provision of section 209.07:
Do the statements of the medical examiner in his report go beyond merely stating his objective findings so as to express an
opinion as to general health or fitness for insurance? The mere
fact that one statement may express an opinion with respect to
one element of the whole such as does question 20, should be
held to be insufficient to constitute an expression of opinion
43 as
to the total health or fitness of the applicant for insurance.
The dissent under such a test holds that the question under discussion
did not cause the report to come within the application of the estoppel
statute because "the opinion asked for in question 20, does not relate
39 27 Wis. 2d 1, 133 N.W. 2d 277 (1965).
Wis. 2d at 9, 133 N.W. 2d at 282.

40 27

Id. at 7,133 N.W. 2d at 281.
Id. at 11, 133 N.W. 2d at 283.
43 Id. at 12, 133 N.W. 2d at 284.
41
42
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to the general fitness of the applicant so as to constitute a certificate of
health. Rather, it is restricted to the habits, surroundings, or occupation
of the applicant." 4
It is submitted that the dissent is justified in holding that the majority's application of section 209.07 to question 20 of the examination
report is an unwarranted extention of the express terms of section
209.07. However, it may be that the motive prompting such an extention is not unsound. It might well be argued that in the absence of fraud,
once an applicant has been subjected to a medical examination by the
insurer's examiner, that no lack of a condition of good health prior to
the issuance of the policy should be available as a defense to the insurer.
The effect would be to extend the statute to those medical reports which
the courts have in the past held to be outside the operation of the estoppel statute. If such liberalization, as is illustrated in its primary stage
by Platke, is carried to its fullest extent as indicated above, much of the
prior case law restricting the availability of section 209.07 would be
inapplicable. However, while the decisions prior to Platke would probably be decided similarly under the Platke rule due to the particular
facts of those cases, it is doubtful whether the narrow interpretation
of the applicability of section 209.07 announced in such earlier opinions
is consistent with Platke's broader construction.
THE APPLICANT'S FRAUD

Initially, it is essential to understand the fraud of the insured which
vitiates application of the estoppel under section 209.07 is fraud in the
procurement of the medical certificate and not the policy itself. In the
absence of proof that the insured obtained the medical certificate or its
statutory counterpart through his fraud, the insurer will be estopped
or prevented from denying liability because of the fact that the insured
was not in the condition of health required for coverage by the policy.
This view is amply illustrated by the Iowa court in the Weimer case
where the court declared, ".

.

. and the fraud or deceit referred to is

that of procurring the report or certificate of the physician and not the
policy .... ,,4"
The Iowa court amplified such holding in the subsequent
case of Stewart v. Equitable Mut. Life Ass'n. by finding that the word
"same" in the last clause of the statute referred to "issue a certificate
of health or declare the applicant a fit subject for insurance, or so report to the company." In so doing the court declared, "we think that the
reasonable and certainly the grammatical construction of the statute." 46
The Wisconsin court echoed such holdings by declaring that the statute
applied ".

.

. in the absence of fraud or deceit practiced by the insured

44 Id. at 11, 133 N.VAT. 2d at 283.

45 108 Iowa at 451, 79 N.W.at 123.
46 110 Iowa 528, 81 N.W.782, 783 (1900).
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upon the medical examiner in order to induce a favorable report....
48
While there has been some argument against this construction, the
courts have been in concert with the Iowa court's statement in Wood
v.Farmers' Life Ass'n.:
Any other construction of the language of the statute would leave
it without effect, for it would still be open to the company, as it
was before the statute, to contend that the policy was fraudulently procurred by reason of false statements in the application,
and the truth of the statements would thereby practically be made
matter of warranty, not withstanding the medical examination . ..49
50
The Wisconsin court in Monahan v.Mut. Life Ins. Co. made a
fundamental, yet all important, distinction between a mere false statement by an insurance applicant and fraud in the insurance application:
This section applies to all oral or written statements made in the
negotiation of a contract of insurance. While sec. 209.07 deals
specifically with the certificate of health and estops the company
from going back of that certificate unless the same was procured by or through the fraud or deceit of the insured, we cannot ignore the provisions of sec. 209.06 in determining what constitutes such fraud and deceit. By the latter section it is not sufficient to prove that the statements were merely false. It must appear that the false statements were made with actual intent to
deceive.
5
The Iowa court in Equitable Life Ins. Co. v.Mann ' defined the six
elements that must be established to prove fraud.
(1) There must be a material misrepresentation of an existing fact.
The Iowa court cited a Fourth Circuit Court decision, Fountain &
Herringtonv.Mutual Life Ins. Co., which held: "Answers made in response to questions in the application as to prior illness, consultation
with physicians and applications for other insurance, where the applicant, as here, declares that they are true and offers them as an inducement to the issuance of the policy, are deemed material as a matter of
law. ..."5'
Some courts have even gone so far as to declare, as did a Massachusetts court,5 3 that inquiry by the company relative to a specific matter conclusively established its materiality. However, such a statement
would probably have to be qualified in practice so as to cover only those
matters which in fact do relate to the insurance risk.

4 Frozena v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 211 Wis. 373, 376, 247 N.W. 333, 334

(1933).
L. REv. 447 (1936).
-s 11 "ris.
49

121 Iowa 44, 95 N.W. 226, 227 (1903).

50 192 Wis. 102, 107, 212 N.W. 269, 271 (1927).
5' 233

Iowa 293, 7 N.W. 2d 566, 567 (1943).
F. 2d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1932).
5sCobb v. Covenant Mut. Benefit Ass'n., 153 Mass. 176, 26 N.E. 230 (1891).
5255
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It is obvious that for a medical examiner to clearly evaluate the
insurability of an applicant, he must establish more than the applicant's
present physical condition as indicated by the various physical measurements which he has made. He must also attempt to discover any latent
conditions which may not be exposed by normal medical tests. Knowledge of the past history of the health of the applicant and his family is
vital to such a task. These latter two elements become extremely important as far as the examiner's evaluations and recommendations are concerned. Any substantial deviation from the truth of such matters will
constitute a per se material misrepresentation of an existing fact. In this
regard, most courts hold that is it not necessary for the applicant to reveal his trivial illnesses.54 The Iowa court declared:
Thus, it has been held that a statement that the applicant is in
good health is not shown to be false by proof of a temporary ailment, not indicating a vice in the constitution or so serious as to
have some bearing on the general health and continuance of
health; that is, such as acording to common understanding would
be called a disease.55
However, in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 56 the applicant for insurance had consulted a doctor within five years for a
matter which appeared trivial to the applicant and yet the court held
the estoppel protection inapplicable. The court found that the applicant
had in effect committed fraud in his repeated statements to the medical
examiner that he had not consulted any physicians. Such prior examinations may constitute a source of information to the medical examiner
and may reveal conditions of the applicant's health not discovered by
the medical examiner in his physical examination of the applicant.
Thus, a court may hold repeated denials of the existence of prior medical examinations constitute fraud, even though the source of such examinations was a trivial matter.
(2) It must be established that the representation was false, that is
untrue in the objective sense. (3) That the insurance applicant had
knowledge that his statement to the medical examiner was false. (4)
The applicant's intention that the misrepresentation be relied upon by
the medical examiner, is one of the most important of the six elements
required to establish fraud. This element may be a question for the
jury as the trier of fact 5 7 or the court may find it as a matter of law. 58

(5)

The fifth element follows from the fourth, that is, the medical

_5Schneider v. Wis. Life Ins. Co., 273 Wis. 105, 113, 76 N.W. 2d 586, 589 (1955).
55 Sargent v. Modern Brotherhood, 148 Iowa 600, 127 N.W. 52, 55 (1910). See
also Annot. 172 A.L.R. 143, 151 (1948).
56260 F. 641 (8th Cir. 1919) ; See also Annot. 172 A.L.R. 143, 151 (1948).
57 See Platke v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 27 Wis. 2d 1, 133 N.W. 2d 277
(1965) for a good example of this principle.
58 Monahan v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 192 Wis. 102, 109, 212 N.W. 269, 272
(1927).
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examiner who made the actual examination relied upon the misrepresentation of the applicant in making a report favorable to the applicant.
The Iowa court declared in Boos v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.:
The question is not, therefore, whether, if true answers had been
made to the questions, a policy would have been issued by the
defendent company. It might, or might not, with full information have accepted the risk. The inquiry at this point is limited
to the effect of false statements upon the examining physician in
determining and ascertaining the state of health of the applicant.
Was he misled and deceived thereby and induced to issue a certificate of health when, had he been apprised of the facts, he
would not have done so? This question must be answered by the
testimony of the physician himself. 59
The Wisconsin court by all indications is in accord with the Iowa rule
laid down in the Boos case. However, the Wisconsin court was somewhat confused in its reasoning in Monahan v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. as
is shown by the following quotation:
Respondent contends that the medical examiner for the appellant
did not rely upon her statements, but relied entirely upon his
own examination and that therefore her statements are not material. This contention cannot be sustained. It is well known that
insurance companies, in determining whether an applicant is a fit
subject for insurance, rely not only upon a physical examination ....

60

Here the court answered the respondent's contention that the medical
examiner did not rely upon the respondent's misrepresentation, by declaring as a matter of law that insurers do rely upon such representations as were made by the respondent. The court, in effect, made the
reliance of the insurer upon the misrepresentation rather than the reliance of the medical examiner, the crucial issue. This position is clearly
erroneous and fails to meet the respondent's argument. Reliance by the
insurance company is not an essential element in the proof of fraud for
its reliance upon the medical report or certificate is presumed, in the
absence of any showing to the contrary.6'
(6) The sixth and last element of fraud which must be established
is that the insurance company was thereby defrauded. It must be shown
that the insurer is in a position less favorable than it was before the
misrepresentation and that a cause for such change was in fact the
misrepresentation. That is, the insurer got less than he bargained for.
The determination of whether fraud exists is usually a question for
the jury. However, juries are often reluctant to find any intent to defraud once the insured is dead. A good illustration of this point is found
59 205 Iowa 653, 216 N.W. 50, 51 (1927).
60 212 N.W. 269, 272 (1927).

61 Bohen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 188 Iowa 349, 177 N.W. 706, 711 (1920).
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in Conklin v. New York Life Ins. Co.62 Here the insured stated in his
application that he had not been treated by any physician within five
years. He also declared that no tests had been taken which established
the presence of diabetes. However, the insured had been treated for
diabetes over a period of more than a year with eleven days spent in
the hospital due to such illness. Nevertheless, while such facts were
established, the jury in a special verdict found no intent on the applicant's part to deceive the medical examiner. This is but one example of
the many cases6" in which the jury has flagrantly disregarded the actual
facts and found a lack of intent to deceive, despite facts which preclude
everything but fraudulent intent. To counteract such irresponsible tactics by the juries, the courts in these cases have tended to find an intent
to deceive "as a matter of law." 64 The courts have done so after a close
view of the facts of each case, particularly the intelligence and occupation of the insured. This point is vividly illustrated by the Wisconsin
court in the Conklin case where the court stated:
It seems incredible that an intelligent man such as the deceased
undoubtedly was, who had been treated for diabetes for over a
period of more than a year with eleven days in a hospital, could
forget such weighty and material matters even if, as the plaintiff
claims, the examination was made in the factory at a time when
he was busily engaged in other matters and under somewhat distracting conditions. Such being the case, the false answers could
have been made for no other possible purpose than to induce reliance upon them and thereby deceive the defendant company. 65
In the Platke case, 66 the court found no intent to deceive as a matter
of law and affirmed a jury's special verdict finding that the insured
made misrepresentations without an intent to deceive. This may be taken
by some to be an indication that today's court has retreated from its
prior history of overturning the jury's finding of fact and finding deceit
as a matter of law. However, such conclusion is unfounded. The court's
affirmation of the jury's findings has a rational basis in the facts of that
case. First, the court properly found that there was an ambiguity in
the applicant's responses to several questions in the medical report, and
second, the insurer's medical examiner testified that the insured "did
not appear to be very bright . . .didn't have insight into what was
wanted of him ....,,67
The court held the "jury could have thus concluded that he [the insured] was not likely to have entertained the de62200 Wis. 94, 227 N.V. 251 (1929).
63 Demirjian v. New York Life Ins.
Frozena v. 'Metropolitan Life Ins.
are demonstrative of this principle.
64 Ibid.
65 Conklin v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
66 Platke v. John Hancock Life Ins.
283 (1965).
67 Id. at 10-ll, 133 N.W. 2d at 283.

Co., 205 Wis. 71, 236 N.W. 566 (1931);
Co., 211 Wis. 373, 247 N.W. 333 (1933)
200 Wis. 94, 99, 227 N.W. 251, 253 (1929).
Co., 27 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 133 N.W. 2d 277,
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ceitful intentions which the appellant ascribes to him."6 s Therefore, it
appears that in the future both fraud, found as a matter of fact by a
jury and fraud found as a matter of law by the court, will continue to
exclude certain cases from the estoppel of section 209.07.
CONCLUSION

Section 209.07 was enacted to prevent insurance coverage forefeiture under certain facts. In effect, the statute was aimed at destroying the possibility of a denial of insurance coverage to an applicant because of a misstatement or concealment to the insurer's medical examiner who had the duty of judging the insurance risk involved. Our
laws are generally expressive of a great disdain for legal forefeitures,
especially in cases where no real moral fault is involved. Such principle
takes on a meaningful expression in section 209.07. Indeed, the thought
of an impoverished widow being denied the proceeds from a life insurance policy that her deceased husband faithfully maintained throughout his life is distasteful. This is especially true if the reason for such
denial is the husband's failure to mention a past serious illness which
he forgot or thought inconsequential. Yet, while our emotions would
tend to condemn such a situation, our minds should take cognizance of
the needs of the insurer in its function of determining the insurability
of an applicant before accepting a particular risk. As long as the life
insurance industry is cradled in the hands of private enterprise, and
prudential risk acceptance is required for business survival, there must
be a legal recognition of the reciprocal rights and duties of both the
insured and the insurer. Despite this, a statute such as section 209.06,
which provides that false statements made without any intent to deceive
by an insurance applicant may defeat the policy if the misstatement increased the risk or contributed to the loss, seems somewhat unjust in
certain cases. An example of such is the case where the insurer has put
the applicant through the inconvenience of a medical examination and
has actually received the medical examiner's judgment of the insurability of the applicant. Shouldn't the insurer bear the risk of its medical
examiner's failure to discover the true physical condition of the applicant, when the medical examiner's tests and measurements result in
the issuance of a report in the insurability of the applicant? Once the
insurer has used an expert to decide for it the difficult question of insurability, who should the burden of an innocent misrepresentation or
concealment be placed on? Section 209.07 has placed it on the insurance
company rather than the individual insured. The only question now is
whether the law will evolve to the point where a medical examination
alone, without any real judgment of the insurance risk by the medical
68 Id. at 10-11, 133 N.W. 2d at 283.
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examiner, will activate the estoppel of section 209.07 in the absence of
fraud or deceit. It apears that the Platke case is a big step in that direction. The Platke decision may be the outer limits of the court's construction of section 209.07, or it may be just a milestone on the way to
a broader construction.
DAVID W.
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